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Law as Asymmetric Information: Theory, 
Application, and Results in the Context of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Real Estate 
INTRODUCTION 
In his 1970 article, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, George Akerlof posited that there is a potential for market 
failure in situations where the buyer and seller possess asymmetrical valuation 
information.1 Akerlof further concluded that if valuation information is an 
endemic concern in a market susceptible to asymmetries, higher value products 
will be increasingly driven out by lower value products, as there will be no 
mechanism by which buyers will be able to correctly or approximately discern 
the value of a specific product. The importance of accurate information about 
value has only increased in the four decades since the publication of Akerlof’s 
article. Global trade has enabled individuals, once unable to transact, to trade in 
goods, commodities, and securities on a daily basis. Measured by both volume 
and value, these newly empowered trades show extensive growth.2 In regional 
and international markets, valuation information is extraordinarily important, 
yet even in an increasingly connected age where information is readily 
available, certain types of valuation information may still prove elusive to even 
the most discerning buyer. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications of potential 
asymmetric information in a discrete subclass of valuation information: the 
law. The legal attributes of a given tradable good may or may not be relevant to 
its ultimate valuation, but in those cases where the legal attribute does serve as 
a significant basis for the buyer’s initial valuation, information asymmetries 
have the potential to not only arise, but be of such dimension that they could 
contribute to a market failure. The clearest case of such asymmetric 
information would concern issues of ultimate ownership, but the class of legal 
attributes that could be subsumed within the category of asymmetric 
information is broad, varied, and nuanced. The globalization of law and legal 
 
1. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
2. See, e.g., Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the 
Forward Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 196-97 (2007) (“WTO trade statistics 
show that in goods alone, world trade levels have increased approximately seventy-fold since 1960, not 
accounting for inflation.”) (citing World Trade Organization Statistics Database, 
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language (last visited Oct. 23, 2010))); Alan Dignam & 
Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context, 28 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 201, 213 (2008) (“[R]ising industrial output also led to the increase of international trade 
from the 1950s onward with substantial increases after each successive GATT agreement.”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677620
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practice is likely to both assuage and exacerbate these concerns, as complexity 
will beget greater complexity, even as the knowledge of buyers, sellers, and 
their lawyers advances with each successive advent of greater complexity. 
This article is concerned with both the general applicability of Akerlof’s 
model of asymmetric information and the specific application of that model to 
the market for foreign direct investment in real estate. Part I addresses 
Akerlof’s initial theory of lemons markets, along with subsequent empirical 
tests of the theory. Part II reviews prevailing applications of the theory to the 
field of law, while also proposing a general extension of how law itself may be 
a relevant source of asymmetric information. Part III marks the beginning of 
the more specific aspects of this article, which are concerned with how legal 
attributes may constitute a source of asymmetric information in a particular 
market: the real estate market. Accordingly, this part reviews the relevant 
economic literature regarding the application of the lemons theory to domestic 
real estate markets. Additionally, this part offers a more complete model of 
asymmetric information in real estate markets by including a discrete subclass 
of such information under the rubric “legal attributes.” This theoretical model 
of asymmetric information is then tested in the context of foreign direct 
investment in both real estate and stock in real estate, in order to ascertain 
whether market failure results from such asymmetries. In concluding, this 
article proposes legal and institutional reforms that could mitigate or eliminate 
asymmetric information in the context of legal attributes. These reforms will be 
most relevant to developing and transitional economies, where institutional 
disadvantages play a significant role in impeding investment in the domestic 
economy. Ultimately, this article seeks to highlight the need for legal and 
institutional protections as a means to combat market asymmetries and channel 
needed foreign investment to countries that could substantially benefit from 
such investment. 
I. AKERLOF’S LEMONS MODEL 
The basis for Akerlof’s lemons model was his assumption that, in certain 
markets, sellers will have a tendency to market poorer quality goods, as the 
benefits associated with the sale of quality goods will accrue to the entire group 
of sellers constituting the market rather than to the individual sellers offering 
the higher quality good alone.3 This process will gradually lead to the 
prevalence of poorer quality goods in the market as the share of quality goods 
in the market decreases, and then to a market failure where sales of the relevant 
good will not take place regardless of the price.4 Akerlof applied this theory to 
the market for cars. In the car market, there are both new and used cars, good 
 
3. Akerlof, supra note 1, at 488. 
4. Id. 
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cars and lemons, and a new and used car can be either a good car or a lemon. In 
both the new and used car markets, a buyer will not know the exact quality of 
the car he is purchasing. Each buyer faces the possibility that the car he is about 
to purchase is either a quality car, notated by Akerlof as q, or a lemon, notated 
as 1—q. However, because the buyer does not have adequate information to 
evaluate whether the car is a lemon or a quality car, his valuation of each car, 
regardless of its actual quality, is based on the initial q / 1—q probability.5 The 
buyer will subsequently gain knowledge regarding the actual value of the 
purchased car, and thus adjust his estimate of the car’s value. Yet when this 
buyer reenters the market to sell the car the new prospective buyer of the car 
will face the same initial valuation of the car, namely q / 1—q. Thus good cars 
and lemons will tend towards the same price valuation. “[B]ad cars sell at the 
same price as good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference 
between a good and a bar car; only the seller knows.”6 
This in turn means that a good car is unlikely to be sold at its true or 
expected value, thus continually increasing the prevalence of lemons in the 
market which in turn contributes to a greater decrease in good cars, until the 
lemons entirely push the good cars from the market. In addition to the used car 
market, Akerlof also noted the potential repercussions of asymmetric 
information in the insurance market, in the context of minority employment 
hiring, and credit markets in underdeveloped countries.7 Market failure is not a 
necessary end to this process, but it is a possibility, as lower quality goods may 
increasingly drive out higher quality goods ultimately causing the market for 
that good to cease to exist at all.8 
Market failure may be forestalled, however, by certain counteracting 
institutions which, in essence, act as a minimal warrant of quality or value in 
situations where asymmetric information might potentially be present. These 
institutions include: 1) guarantees, which shift risk to the seller; 2) brand-
names, which indicate a uniform quality and give the buyer recourse if the 
quality is inferior; 3) chains, which operate in a manner similar to brand-names 
by ensuring quality across geographical regions; and 4) licensing and 
certification practices, which ensure a minimal level of competency and 
proficiency.9 Despite the possibility of palliative counteracting institutions, 
however, Akerlof concluded that the root cause of information asymmetries in 
markets is the very existence of those markets. “[T]he difficulty of 
distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in the business world; this may 
indeed explain many economic institutions and may in fact be one of the more 
 
5. Id. at 489. 
6. Id. at 489-90. 
7. Id. at 492-94, 494-95, 497-99. 
8. See id. at 490. 
9. Id. at 499-500. 
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important aspects of uncertainty.”10 
The importance of asymmetric information to the functioning of markets 
has lead to several tests and refinements of Akerlof’s lemons model in the years 
since the article’s first publication. The literature in response to Akerlof’s 
model helps to explain the nature of market situations where quality uncertainty 
might predominate, and also introduces factors which may effectively 
counteract informational asymmetries. This literature review proceeds by 
assessing substantive critiques of Akerlof’s theory itself, followed by market 
tests of the model, before concluding with two articles refining the initial 
parameters of the lemons model. 
In 1976, Geoffrey Heal offered the first substantive critique of Akerlof’s 
lemons model. Heal theorized that market failure would only stem from short-
sighted traders, and would not be a likely outcome in a market where the 
interested participants assumed that there would be multiple transactions rather 
than a single sale.11 In markets where a course of conduct between buyers and 
sellers can be assumed, then, “the chances of bad products driving out good fall 
as the weight that traders give to future benefits rises; in other words, we can 
only be sure that bad products will drive out good if traders are sufficiently 
shortsighted.”12 In response, Akerlof agreed with the essence of Heal’s claim, 
but contended that any continuity in the relationship of traders is likely 
buttressed by the types of counteracting institutions he had previously noted.13 
Akerlof asserted that counteracting institutions such as brand names, credit 
ratings, and labor accreditation functioned to “ link the past, the present, and 
the future so that players can know that the game indeed is repetitive.”14 
Empirical tests have provided mixed evidence of actual lemons markets, as 
well as competing views as to why a particular market is or is not a lemons 
market. Two significant contributions to the literature debated whether or not 
the market for used pickup trucks is a lemons market. In a 1982 study, Eric 
Bond argued that the market for used pickup trucks is not a lemons market, 
either because counteracting institutions, such as warranties, are prevalent, or 
because buyers can obtain sufficient information to negate any asymmetry.15 In 
a response to Bond, Michael Pratt and George Hoffer contended that the market 
for used pickup trucks is a lemons market, basing their conclusion on 
expenditure data related to the repairs actually made to those classes of pickup 
trucks that were and were not transacted during a set timeframe.16 Disagreeing 
 
10. Id. at 500. 
11. Geoffrey Heal, Do Bad Products Drive Out Good?, 90 Q. J. ECON. 499, 500-01 (1976). 
12. Id. at 501. 
13. See George A. Akerlof, Reply to Professor Heal, 90 Q. J. ECON. 503 (1976). 
14. Id. at 503. 
15. Eric W. Bond, A Direct Test of the “Lemons” Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks, 72 
AM. ECON. REV. 836, 836-37 (1982). 
16. Michael D. Pratt & George E. Hoffer, Test of the Lemons Model: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. 
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with the results reached by Pratt and Hoffer, Bond replied that their 
determination of a lemons market was most likely a result of their failure to 
control for observable quality differences in the trucks, as well as their 
inclusion of older trucks in their data samples.17 Accordingly, Bond reiterated 
his conclusion that the market for used pickup trucks is not a lemons market.18 
Rather than test whether a given market is a lemons market along the 
metrics of Akerlof’s original article, Jae-Cheol Kim proposed a refinement of 
the initial model. In doing so, he determined that the used car market need not 
be a lemons market if the potential changeability of the agent’s status is 
incorporated into the model.19 Kim’s model thus incorporated the fact that the 
denomination “buyer” and “seller” is not static in durable goods markets. 
Kim’s expanded model also took into account additional endogenous valuation 
factors, including those pertaining to maintenance and driving habits, rather 
than purely stochastic elements.20 Finally, Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri 
noted that a used goods market need not tend towards failure if the market is 
responsive to the dynamic interactions between the new and used goods 
market.21 Specifically, Hendel and Lizzeri pointed out the fact that buyers may 
be able to easily transact in either a used or new goods market for any given 
good, thus assuring a minimum level of quality in the used goods market based 
on the possibility of other choices should quality tend to drop too 
precipitously.22 
Although these studies reach different conclusions, they all highlight the 
importance of information to economic transactions, either by finding market 
failure in situations of asymmetric information, or by determining that the 
presence of counteracting institutions forestalls possible market failure by 
filling the information gap between the buyer and seller. Despite challenges and 
modifications, Akerlof’s lemons model remains central to information 
economics. It is because of the theory’s intuitive appeal and its relative success 
in withstanding empirical scrutiny that the fundamentals of the lemons model, 
namely the problems of adverse selection and asymmetric information, remain 
central to the project of information economics. 
 
REV. 798 (1984). 
17. Eric W. Bond, Test of the Lemons Model: Reply, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 801 (1984). 
18. See id. 
19. See generally Jae-Cheol Kim, The Market for “Lemons” Reconsidered: A Model of the Used 
Car Market with Asymmetric Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 836 (1985). 
20. Id. at 836. 
21. See generally Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets, 
89 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1999). 
22. Id. at 1113. 
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II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEMONS MODEL 
The preceding part dealt entirely with the economic aspects of the problem 
of asymmetric information. That is, where quality uncertainty is present, buyers 
will have to undertake a course of action based only on an incomplete 
understanding of the quality of the good being purchased. This could lead to a 
market failure in the given market, adverse selection by the buyer, or the rise of 
counteracting institutions which seek to eliminate the impact of asymmetric 
information on transaction potential. Although a monolithic conception of the 
law does not fit comfortably within the classes of counteracting institutions 
noted by Akerlof, it does operate in specific circumstances as a warranty or 
guarantee against poor quality. The purpose of this part is to explore the legal 
implications of asymmetric information along two possible dimensions. The 
first addresses those situations where law acts as a counteracting institution in 
markets prone to information asymmetries. The second dimension, and the 
main concern of this article, is when law itself constitutes a base of asymmetric 
information between a buyer and seller. 
Taking a cue from Akerlof’s explicit use of the used car market as his test 
case, the clearest impact of the lemons model has been in the enactment of 
“Lemon Laws.” Such laws act as a counteracting institution of sorts. These 
laws do not eliminate the potentialities of asymmetric information, but, rather, 
provide recourse to a buyer if he happens to buy a “lemon” rather than a good 
car.
23
 The vast majority of states have enacted some form of a lemon law, 
although these laws differ significantly from state to state concerning what 
vehicles fall within their protections, what sellers are liable under the law, and 
what recourse an injured buyer may have.24 Nonetheless, the underlying 
rationale is identical—the seller is responsible to the buyer for injuries caused 
by defects that were unascertainble to the buyer.25 The seller’s responsibility 
 
23. See Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of State Motor Vehicle 
Warranty Legislation (Lemon Laws), 88 A.L.R.5th 301 § 2[a] (2001) (“Although no two lemon laws are 
exactly alike, generally, they provide that if a consumer, who has purchased a motor vehicle reports a 
defect or nonconformity covered by the manufacturer’s express warranty within a specified time, the 
manufacturer or its agent must make the repairs necessary to correct the problem.”). 
24. See generally id.; see also Heather Newton, When Life Gives You A Lemon: North Carolina 
Adopts Automobile Warranty Legislation, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (1988). 
25. See Cagiva N. Am. v. Schenk, 680 A.2d 964, 971 (Conn. 1996) (“[T]he rationale behind the 
lemon bill has been to improve and enhance the responsiveness an[d] accountability of automobile 
manufacturers to consumer complaints with defective new cars…. The lemon bill … gives [the] 
consumer rights against … the party responsible for the defective car.”) (alterations in original, internal 
citations omitted) (quoting 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1982 Sess., at 3163, 3123) (statements of Rep. 
Woodcock); Subaru of Am. v. Peters, 500 S.E.2d 803, 804 (Va. 1998) (Virginia’s law “provides that if a 
consumer has purchased a motor vehicle . . . and reports, within a specified period of time, a defect or 
nonconformity . . . the manufacturer or its agent must perform the repairs necessary to correct the 
problem. If the vehicle cannot be conformed to the warranty after a reasonable number of attempts, the 
consumer is entitled to replacement of the vehicle or refund of the purchase price.”). See also Joan 
Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 615-47 (1985) (discussing the substantive provisions of 31 state lemon laws, 
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ranges from a responsibility to reimburse the buyer for the cost of injuries or 
provide a replacement vehicle. Such legislation also seeks to influence behavior 
by placing the financial responsibility for poor quality sales on the seller, thus 
hopefully inducing a minimal level of quality in the goods which enter that 
market. Here, the law acts as a warranty in certain circumstances, and, in 
essence, as a third-party guarantee. Such laws stem directly from Akerlof’s 
initial model, but they are not without their critics. These critiques focus on the 
fact that there is little reason to institute potentially costly and wasteful 
counteracting institutions such as warranties when there is little evidence that 
the used car market functions in an inefficient manner and where the potential 
for an actual market failure is attenuated at best.26 In such circumstances, the 
counteracting institution may do more harm than good by interrupting or 
altering the otherwise efficient operation of the market. 
Although lemon laws are the clearest legal progeny of Akerlof’s theory, 
application of the model has expanded in recent years to take account of a 
greater number of situations presenting a confluence of legal and economic 
theory. University of Toronto law professor Ariel Katz has defended 
pharmaceutical regulation on the basis that the market for pharmaceuticals has 
the potential to constitute a lemons market in the absence of effective 
counteracting institutions.27 Such regulation, which ensures quality, prevents 
the industry from embarking on a race to the bottom. Scholars have noted the 
deleterious aspects of asymmetric information in the context of the emerging 
markets for genetically modified foods, where a lack of accurate information 
about the various benefits of engineered foods has hindered the broader 
development of markets in such products.28 Legal reforms to reduce the 
potential for asymmetric information in the insured-insurer relationship have 
also been proposed as an extension of Akerlof’s initial work, most recently in 
the context of the possibility that genetic information could be used to decline 
coverage.29 Further academic work has also been undertaken in the context of 
criminal law sentencing and juvenile expungement regimes,30 labor and 
 
including the rationale for the passage of the laws). 
26. See, e.g., Bruce Mann & Thomas J. Holdych, When Lemons are Better than Lemonade: The 
Case Against Mandatory Used Car Warranties, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1996). 
27. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
28. Kim JoDene Donat, Note, Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information Asymmetry, Externalities, 
and Market Intervention in the Genetically Modified Food Market, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 417 
(2003). 
29. See Kathleen Tradash, Note, Preventing a Market for “Lemons”: A Voluntary Disclosure 
Model as an Alternative to the Prohibition of Genetic Discrimination and the Distortion of Allocative 
Efficiency, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1353 (2002). 
30. T. Markus Funk & Daniel D. Polsby, Distributional Consequences of Expunging Juvenile 
Delinquency Records: The Problem of Lemons, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 161 (1997) 
(arguing differential expungement regimes may give rise to later informational asymmetries in the 
context of, e.g., adult sentencing, whereby a full picture of an individual’s criminal history will be 
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employment contracting,31 and asset securitization.32 Each of these diverse 
applications of the lemons model has approached the economic problem by 
showing how the law itself can counteract the effects of asymmetric 
information. Law, in these cases, aims to rectify or forestall any harm 
attributable to the prevalence of asymmetric information by acting on the 
market itself. Law thus counteracts market asymmetries in myriad ways: it may 
provide a cause of action against a seller, introduce a regulatory scheme to 
establish minimal quality guarantees, or mandate certain disclosures to 
eliminate asymmetric information. Whatever role it takes on, however, it takes 
on the guise of a palliative or a limited solution. It may help to restore the status 
quo as between the buyer and the seller, but it does not address or otherwise 
alleviate the underlying fact of asymmetric information. 
 Instances where the law acts as a counteracting institution do not exhaust 
the range of interaction between law and information economics. Far from 
being remedial, law itself can constitute a ground of asymmetric information 
between buyer and seller. This can undoubtedly be true in the purely domestic 
context. But the issue is exacerbated in the transnational or international 
context, where a domestic seller’s market may be peopled by foreign buyers. 
Accordingly, this article examines transactions between a foreign buyer and a 
domestic seller in order to highlight the importance of information concerning 
the governing legal system. Additionally, although it is likely that information 
asymmetries regarding law can and will arise regardless of the specific legal 
system, the development and status of effective counteracting institutions is 
also significant, insofar as such institutions may protect foreign buyers in 
several discrete ways. It is these institutions which may be sorely lacking or 
underdeveloped in transition economies, leading to a greater potential for 
market failure if law otherwise constitutes a ground of asymmetric information. 
Law may act as asymmetric information in several ways, some more, others 
less virulent, some intractable, others easily remediable. One party’s ignorance 
of the law is the most obvious basis for asymmetry, but this can arise from 
several factors, including linguistic barriers and a general misunderstanding of 
a legal system that differs fundamentally from one’s own. One example of this 
unilateral ignorance occurs when one party is familiar with civil law traditions 
whereas the other party operates under the common law. Asymmetries on these 
grounds may be remediable through the retention of local counsel whom 
 
unavailable for review). 
31. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the 
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953 (1996) (positing asymmetric 
information between employers and employees as the cause behind certain patterns in labor contract 
provisions). 
32. Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 
(1996) (arguing that securitization may effectively signal or impart valuable information regarding the 
securitizing firm’s financial state). 
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otherwise possesses the relevant information and expertise in the subject 
country. Ignorance of the law can take another, more problematic form, 
however, if the basis of ignorance results from the failures or obfuscations of 
the domestic legal system itself. This type of ignorance could be attributable to 
the inadequate publication or dissemination of rules of law and procedure by 
the relevant domestic authority, meaning that appeal to local counsel or an 
expert may be unavailing to the foreign buyer. Even if the law is “known” in 
some superficial sense, there could be a general inability to ascertain whether a 
particular principle applies in a given case or context. Perhaps the law is new, 
rarely or erratically applied, or is simply written in inaccessible terms. 
Relatedly, unnecessary complexity in the law can cause informational 
asymmetry. The domestic law pertaining to a given issue may be too complex 
to provide any objectively correct answer to anyone not intimately familiar 
with the governing standards, which will, more likely than not, include foreign 
buyers. This complexity might make the buyer’s rights and obligations unclear, 
and obfuscate relevant issues on the buyer’s side, including ownership and the 
nature of any interest sought to be conveyed. 
Additionally, there may be tensions between central legal rules and 
processes and local rules. If there are multiple political subdivisions within a 
state, as in countries with a federal structure like the United States, there may 
be significant differences in the law despite ostensible proximity between 
locations. Location specific legal rules could potentially pertain to issues of 
court procedure, filing, and notice requirements, and could differ dramatically 
from other local rules as well as national rules. These rules may or may not be 
written, and could be passed down more as a matter of custom and tradition 
than as a function of positive law.33 They may be entirely unwritten and 
unknowable, save for those individuals already operating within the system. 
These various competing domestic legal systems add to the potential for 
confusion or information asymmetry when attempting to ascertain the various 
rights and obligations of agents seeking to engage in a transaction. 
Additionally, there may be informal systems operating instead of, or beside, the 
recognized formal state legal system. Such community based systems are 
common in developing countries, especially in the context of real estate, 
whereby title and other rights of land are supported by informal rules and 
procedures rather than by the formal state legal system.34 The rules in this 
system could be formal to a high degree, in as much as they present an 
elaborate way of transacting business, providing for dispute settlement, and 
recognizing various interests; yet, again, they might be inaccessible to an 
outsider seeking to transact within the system. 
 
33. See infra note 43. 
34. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 15-37 (Basic Books 2000). 
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As noted in the preceding, law can also provide a backstop for the 
protection of rights and interests, even if a buyer is harmed in a transaction 
involving quality uncertainty. Law, when it acts in this way, constitutes a 
counteracting institution that mitigates the impact of potential asymmetric 
information. For law to act in this way, however, there must be a fully 
functioning state, capable of passing relevant laws and regulations, as well as a 
fully functioning and independent judiciary, or other quasi-judicial body, to 
enforce those laws and regulations. The lack of an independent and fairly 
functioning judiciary, the lack of institutional safeguards by which to recognize 
interests and ownership rights, and the inability or unwillingness of a state to 
pass a relevant regulatory or statutory scheme could all contribute to further 
transactional failures in a market already prone to asymmetric information. 
III. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN REAL ESTATE MARKETS 
As a test case, this article proceeds by examining the potential impact of 
asymmetric information in the context of real estate, focusing on “legal 
attributes” as the relevant ground of asymmetric information. More 
specifically, this test is conducted in the context of foreign direct investment 
(“FDI”), which more likely than not will present the situation where an outside-
buyer has less information concerning the governing legal standards in a 
country than the domestic-seller. The hypothesis is that real estate foreign 
direct investment should constitute a smaller percentage of a country’s total 
FDI in countries that have weak legal institutions coupled with more 
complicated, informal, or community-based property systems, than in those 
countries with strong legal institutions and formalized property systems. 
This part proceeds in three subparts. The first reviews a small sample of the 
economic literature concerning information asymmetries in real estate markets. 
Specifically, this subpart focuses on a study conducted in the Hong Kong real 
estate market tending to show that that market does not constitute a lemons 
market. The second subpart more fully theorizes a lemons model for the real 
estate market by taking into account the possibility that legal attributes will be a 
ground of asymmetric information. The final subpart tests the hypothesis 
against FDI data pertaining to both real estate investment and investment in real 
estate stocks across a broad range of countries in North and South America, 
Asia, Europe, and Africa. This part attempts to discern whether there is any 
meaningful difference in the levels of FDI investment in real estate and stock 
between countries with significantly differing levels of institutional and legal 
development. 
A. Brief Review of the Economic Literature 
Academic literature has consistently appreciated the potential for 
GLEN_FORMATTED_FINAL2 1/7/2011  9:37:51 PM 
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 8, 2010 
128 
asymmetric information to disrupt the optimal functioning of real estate 
markets.35 These asymmetries may take several forms. For instance, Jaren Pope 
has observed that location specific disamenities, specifically flooding, lead to a 
higher sales price for the real estate if the buyer is ignorant about the 
disamenity, and that seller disclosures generally reduced the sales price of such 
homes.36 This means that the real estate was valued more accurately after the 
advent of disclosure laws rather than prior to their publication because this 
valuation was now based on more symmetric components than asymmetric 
ones. Similarly, Steven Levitt and Chad Syverson found that houses sold by 
real estate agent-owners sold for a statistically significant higher price than 
those houses that were sold by non-real estate agent-owners, and remained on 
the market for an average of approximately ten days longer.37 This fact was 
attributed to informational distortions between the agent and non-agent seller, 
and a remuneration framework that inadequately aligns the interests of the 
seller and his agent. 
In a recent study, a group of researchers at the University of Hong Kong 
sought to extend Akerlof’s lemons model to the real estate market, and test its 
assertions by analyzing empirical evidence from the Hong Kong real estate 
market.38 For purposes of testing the model in the context of the real estate 
market, the researchers divided information regarding real estate into two 
classes: latent attributes and land attributes. Latent attributes relate to the 
building, structure, or, potentially, certain aspects of the land itself, and include 
seepage, cracks, blockages, noise, flooding, and other hidden or difficult to 
ascertain structural defects.39 Land attributes, on the other hand, include the 
location of the property, its accessibility, views, etc.40 While it is possible that 
asymmetric information could occur in both classes of information, it is more 
likely to occur in the context of latent attributes. This is because latent 
attributes will be harder for a discerning buyer to ascertain than most of the 
land attributes. Accordingly, a prerequisite for any given sale will be that the 
buyer of real estate values the symmetric-based information higher than the 
asymmetric, i.e., that the value he attributes to the land characteristics is higher 
than the value he assigns to the latent attributes, which he may or may not 
 
35. See Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Confronting Information Asymmetries: Evidence 
from Real Estate Markets, (Center for Research in Security Prices, Working Paper No. 507, 1999). 
36. Jaren C. Pope, Do Seller Disclosures Affect Property Values? Buyer Information and the 
Hedonic Model, 84 LAND ECON. 551 (2008). 
37. Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The 
Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 599, 600 (2008). 
38. Siu Kei Wong, Chung Yim Yiu & Kwong Wing Chau, Liquidity and Information Asymmetry in 
the Real Estate Market (Jan. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1539599). 
39. Id. at 3-4. 
40. Id. at 4. 
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know with any specificity.41 In testing this model, the researchers found, among 
other things, that real estate with a high land value relative to the latent 
valuation is more liquid. Although the study concluded that the Hong Kong real 
estate market was not a lemons market, the findings buttress the claim that 
information is integral to an accurate valuation of property, and without 
accurate valuation, transactions may not occur. 
B. Legal Sources of Asymmetric Information in the Context of Real Estate FDI 
The Hong Kong study provides an insufficient model by which to gauge the 
potential effects of asymmetric information on real estate and property markets. 
While the categories of land and latent attributes encompass a broad range of 
information about a given property, they may not represent the whole set of 
relevant information that informs a buyer’s decision to enter into a transaction. 
In order to account for this failure and sufficiently reflect the sources of 
potential asymmetric information a third category should be added: legal 
attributes. The preceding part addressed the law as asymmetric information in a 
general sense; this part will provide a more specific explication of this concept 
by reference to the ways such information may arise in the real estate market. 
The most obvious legal attribute relevant to a prospective buyer would be 
ownership: whether the seller has a conveyable interest, or the exact interest he 
is attempting to convey. In some systems this may become complicated. For 
instance, the real property on which a structure is built may have a separate 
owner from the structure itself, or a different party may have ownership rights 
to the minerals or gases underneath the property. Ownership in this context 
simply looks to an objective confluence of expectation: what the buyer is 
purchasing is both what the seller is selling and is able to legally sell. 
A second legal attribute that has become increasingly important, especially 
in the United States, is the encumbrance. For purposes of this article, the term 
will be used broadly to refer to two categories of encumbrance: financial and 
land. A financial encumbrance is a mortgage on a property, a lien, or some 
other monetary attachment, which could hinder the full and free enjoyment of 
the land by a prospective buyer. A land encumbrance refers to conditions, such 
as rights-of-way, setbacks, and other regulatory or legal “defects” that act on 
the property itself in favor of some third-party, whether a government or a 
natural person. 
As noted previously, legal attributes will more likely be categorized as 
asymmetric information in transactions involving a resident-seller and a non-
resident-buyer. In a formal property system, i.e., a system with a formal and 
functioning title registry, government regulation, and dispute settlement 
 
41. See id. at 6. 
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mechanism, such asymmetries may arise due to the complexity of the domestic 
property law system. The law in the jurisdiction may be obscure or overly 
complicated; alternately, the necessary purchasing and registration processes 
that a buyer must follow may be unclear, or lead to significant gaps concerning 
ownership information, as well as potential time-lags that leave the ownership 
or formal title vague or unascertainable.42 Asymmetries arise in this context 
because of such inefficiencies in the legal system itself. These inefficiencies 
consequently obscure those aspects of the law that are dependent on an 
efficiently functioning legal system. In an informal property system, titling 
requirements and issues of enforceability will be based on community norms 
and local knowledge, rather than on any centralized, formal, or published 
notion of “law.”43 Within such systems the development of the local “legal” 
system, the identity of the parties, and the concomitant development of 
effective internal dispute settlement mechanisms ensures a smooth enforcement 
and transfer of interests. Nonetheless, an outside buyer will have neither 
knowledge of nor ready access to peculiarly local information or knowledge, 
including the relevant procedures by which to purchase and validate interests, 
or by which to challenge other claims. This lack of information and access to it 
will contribute to the existence of asymmetric information as between the 
outside buyer and local seller. 
Combining this notion of legal attributes with the foundational premise of 
the Hong Kong study, information that will be factored into any valuation 
calculation can be divided into the following categories: 
1. Land  location, view, size, aesthetic appeal, etc. 
2. Latent / Structural  latent defects, leakages, cracks in foundation, 
etc. 
3. Legal  ownership (including all probable permutations), 
encumbrance 
Land attributes will almost entirely fall within the category of symmetric 
information. It is improbable that a buyer and seller would be differently 
informed concerning such attributes of the property. Although there may be 
cases where all the land attributes are not readily apparent to a buyer, especially 
in jurisdictions without property disclosure requirements, even in those cases it 
seems likely that symmetric information will predominate over asymmetric. 
Structural attributes are more likely to be a source of asymmetric information 
unless the buyer undertakes a comprehensive inspection of the property, 
 
42. See DE SOTO, supra note 34, at 15-37. 
43. See, e.g., Karol C. Boudreaux, The Human Face of Resource Conflict: Property and Power in 
Nigeria, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 61, 71-77 (2005) (exploring the range of interests and conveyances 
possible under the communal system in parts of Nigeria); Alyssa A. Vegter, Comment, Forsaking the 
Forests for the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 
14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 545, 550-54 (2005) (exploring same for Papua New Guinea). 
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perhaps with the aid of a professional. Even in such cases, information might 
be difficult to gather, and the outcome of the inspection might solely be the 
quantification of unknowns. Furthermore, even if one assumes a savvy buyer, 
in most cases it seems probable that asymmetric information will predominate 
over symmetric information concerning the structural attributes of a given 
property. Yet as the Hong Kong study made clear, land attributes will tend to 
be valued higher than structural attributes, and thus as long as the symmetric 
information is valued higher than the asymmetric “defects” of information, 
transactions will take place. 
But then how do legal attributes fit into this picture? 
From an American perspective, legal attributes would fall within the scope 
of symmetric information. Title and encumbrance can be, for the most part, 
verified through deed and title registries, depending on the state and the county 
in which the property lies. The buyer and seller enjoy equal access to this 
information, and barring filing overlaps, errors, fraud, or other legal 
circumstances, such as adverse possession, this information should be fully 
determinative of the ultimate legal attributes of the property. If symmetric 
information otherwise predominated in the buyer’s calculus, the addition of the 
category of legal attributes has no real effect—the symmetric information will 
simply be even more predominant than the asymmetric. The truth of this fact is, 
however, heavily dependent on the legal and regulatory landscape of the United 
States. Information on legal attributes falls within the scope of symmetric 
information because it is a matter of public knowledge equally available to 
buyers and sellers. Moreover, the more general institutional structure of United 
States law, which establishes both the registries that allow legal attributes to be 
checked and a well-functioning court system in which disputes can be litigated, 
gives a buyer confidence that even if there is information that he does not 
know, there are adequate outlets by which to vindicate his rights. These 
structural and institutional safeguards, although not peculiar to the United 
States system, are nonetheless representative of formal property systems shared 
by only a percentage of the countries in the world. The remaining countries rely 
on a mix of formal and informal elements. Although it is not the purpose of this 
article to explore the myriad differences that characterize various property 
regimes across the globe, a cursory examination of the most pertinent elements 
will illuminate why the addition of the legal attributes category could have 
significant effects on transactions in non-formalized systems. 
The most significant difference will be the lack of an institutional 
repository for official records relating to the ownership of property and 
encumbrances. While one can check for rights-of-way, ownership of 
subterranean interests, outstanding financial liens, etc., in the United States and 
other countries with formal property systems, such access to information is 
likely to be absent from informal property systems and severely lacking in 
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transition economies that straddle the informal/formal dichotomy. In such 
informal systems, a buyer will have to take the seller at his word, whatever that 
may be, and hope for the best regarding actual ownership. The actual state of 
affairs in this context, i.e., whether the seller owns the interest he purports to, 
must, in the informal setting, reside within the asymmetric category of 
information. A corollary to this point is the fact that many local communities in 
less-developed countries undertake their own type of record-keeping, away 
from official governmental interference. This is basically a community-based 
system by which to keep track of who owns what, what the nature of the right 
held is, etc. The problem with this situation is not the objective reality—
whether the seller actually owns the property being sold—but the subjective 
position of the buyer and whether he will chose to put any matter of weight on 
local, informal records. A title written on a scrap of paper and tucked into the 
sleeve of an old binder is unlikely to assuage the fears of a non-local purchaser. 
There is no problem with this type of record keeping within the system; it is 
solely the view from outside that might give one pause in transacting, thus 
placing this information into the asymmetric category for certain classes of 
buyers. 
This asymmetry may not alone be enough to dissuade potential buyers from 
transacting within an informal property system. If asymmetric information is 
not yet valued highly enough to overcome the valuation of the symmetric 
information and forestall the purchase, then the buyer is likely to ask at least 
one more question: if the seller has misrepresented himself, or is mistaken 
about his interest, or is similarly ignorant concerning an important attribute of 
the property, is there a way to vindicate his rights as an injured buyer? This 
question is itself complicated. For legal vindication, there must be laws in place 
that recognize a right of recovery and establish a procedure to follow in order to 
obtain relief. This presumes a functioning judicial system, one in which an 
aggrieved party can seek redress before an impartial tribunal applying clear law 
within a reasonable period of time following the injury. Some or all of these 
definitional points will be lacking in a country or locality that has an informal 
property system, or in a transition economy that has a quasi-formal system. 
Among other problems, court cases may take an extremely long period of time, 
or the law itself may be inadequate in granting rights or offering avenues of 
redress. In these circumstances, the question of whether one will be able to 
enforce rights may be enough to stem transacting. One may be able to live with 
a mistake when it is remediable. When it will not be, reason dictates avoiding 
the situation in the first place. 
Assuming that the institutional structure of the judiciary and government 
will often be problematic, and thus keeping it as a constant negative factor in 
the equation that may lead to transactions, the problem of transition economies 
is likely to be more subtle than that of strictly informal systems. Take two 
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concrete examples: a non-exclusive registration system and an immensely 
complicated registration system. 
Hernando De Soto emphasizes the complexity and time-consuming nature 
of property systems in developing countries.44 This may mean that ownership at 
any given time, as reflected in the governmental records, is inadequate as an 
indicator of potential sales. Perhaps other individuals are in the process of 
purchasing the land simultaneously, or have already effectuated a purchase that 
the records have not yet been amended to reflect. If it may take years to 
effectuate a purchase and record the existence of that interest, there is the 
likelihood of a logjam: multiple buyers with multiple sellers, all believing that 
they are conveying an interest they own or to which they are entitled. The 
potential for a nightmare from the buyer’s perspective is compounded by the 
inadequacy and complexity of the recording systems as well as ineffective 
courts that are unlikely to vindicate any rights or enforce many obligations. In 
this circumstance, it is the cumbersome nature of the system itself that gives 
rise to potential difficulties, which in turn may give rise to information 
asymmetry. 
The Russian experience provides a different kind of problem for potential 
buyers. The story of transition from the centrally-planned economy of the 
Soviet Union, with its lack of private property, to the quasi-market based 
economy of Russia, complete with certain levels of private ownership of vast 
categories of property, is a necessarily complex one that reflects a reversal of 
almost 80 years of practice and expectation.45 Obviously, such a vast 
transformation cannot occur overnight, but the problems the Russian system 
faces are grave and paradigmatic of the concerns other transition economies 
must face. First, there are inadequate institutional safeguards in place. The 
courts are incapable of impartially resolving disputes in an efficient manner, the 
laws that they are required to apply are porous and oftentimes non-
determinative of the issue at hand, and the title registries themselves are not up 
to date or required to reflect all real ownership interests.46 Furthermore, the 
 
44. See DE SOTO, supra note 34, at 15-37. 
45. See generally Andrei A. Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Reforms and Impediments, 
17 LOY. L.A. INT. & COMP. L.J. 1 (1994); Olga Floroff & Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Land Ownership in the 
Russian Federation: Laws and Obstacles, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235 (1993); Douglas R. Haddock, 
Private Property and Russia’s Leap of Faith, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 495 (1993); Mary Holland, An 
Emerging Conception of Fundamental Rights in Contemporary Russia, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 1 (1992); 
Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Property and Small-Scale Privatization in Russia, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 507 
(1993); Patricia G. Woods, From Feudal to Modern: The Evolution of Real Estate Finance in Russia, 8 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 749 (1994). 
46. See, e.g., Serguey Braguinsky, Enforcement of Property Rights During the Russian Transition: 
Problems and Some Approaches to a New Liberal Solution, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (1999) (noting a 
lack of public enforcement mechanisms regarding property rights); Oksana M. Kozyr, The Legal 
Treatment of Immovables Under the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 44 MCGILL L.J. 327 (1999) 
(exploring the range and types of rights to property ownership under Russian law, as well as the 
structure and types of transactions permitted); Evgueny A. Sukhanov, The Right of Ownership in the 
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system as constructed leads to corruption at the local level. While the 
government has moved towards a more centralized and uniform application of 
its property laws, the effects of such an approach have yet to be realized. 
Second, while the law concerning registration of interests has evolved greatly 
since the first steps towards privatization, it is still not sufficiently 
comprehensive.47 Often, it is the interplay of these two problems that gives rise 
to difficulties, such as the former law’s exemption from registration of state 
owned property and the resulting lack of institutional representation of such 
ownership to potential buyers. Although a legal system such as Russia’s imbues 
greater investor and buyer confidence than a local property system in a 
developing country, it is often only superficial. Russia has taken significant 
steps towards a market-based economy and impartial judicial system, but these 
have proved to be insufficient. Existing faults in the framework must be 
addressed before transactions can take place where “legal attributes” would be 
firmly placed within the symmetric component of information. 
There are, thus, many ways in which a property system can fail to give 
adequate notice to buyers. What is presented in the preceding is certainly not 
meant to be exhaustive. The main point is that the structure of a property 
system can have a significant impact on the ability of agents to realize what the 
Hong Kong study deemed the necessary condition—the necessary organization 
of information that will permit transactions.48 
C. Foreign Direct Investment in Real Estate & Stock in Real Estate 
If market failure results from asymmetric information about the legal 
attributes of property, then such failure should be most apparent in the context 
of FDI. In the FDI market, the investor is non-local and consequently more 
vulnerable to a lack of information. This will be gauged by comparing FDI 
inflows in real estate and stock in real estate to the total FDI inflows for a given 
range of countries. If asymmetric information regarding legal attributes does 
have the potential to act to forestall transactions, this should be seen in a 
 
Contemporary Civil Law of Russia, 44 MCGILL L.J. 301 (1999) (presenting an overview of Russia’s 
property rights regime). 
47. See, e.g., William P. Kratzke, Russia’s New Land Code: A Two Percent Solution, 12 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 109 (2003) (recognizing the course of reform in Russia’s treatment of private property 
rights, as well as the fact that further and more expansive reform will be necessary); Matthew J. Madalo, 
Comment, The Controversial Land Code of the Russian Federation: A Balanced Approach to Resolving 
Russia’s Land Reform Question and Encouraging Foreign Investment, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577 
(2002) (noting specifically the lack of meaningful reform or regulation in the context of the agricultural 
sector, one of the largest classes of property in Russia). 
48. Hong Kong’s property regime is not perfectly formalized, but it is more than capable of alerting 
prospective buyers to relevant legal information. See generally W.K. Thomson, The Land Registration 
Ordinance of Hong Kong: Historical and Legal Aspects, 4 HONG KONG L.J. 242 (1974); Lydia Chan, 
Hong Kong Land Titles Ordinance: The Shape of Things to Come, 35 HONG KONG L.J. 627 (2005). 
Accordingly, there is little likelihood that the inclusion of the category “legal attributes” in that model 
would have altered the results of that study. 
GLEN_FORMATTED_FINAL2 1/7/2011  9:37:51 PM 
Law as Asymmetric Information  
 135 
comparison of real estate and stock inflows as a percentage of a country’s total 
inflows, as compared across countries with differing levels of legal 
development and protections. The data provided below is based on the foreign 
direct investment information collected by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”).49 
The United States provides a useful and concise starting point because 
although its property regime is governed at the local level, it is uniformly 
formal. Accordingly, if the hypothesis of this article is correct, one should 
expect to see higher shares held by FDI in real estate and stock as compared to 
countries with less developed property rights regimes. 
 
Table 1: United States FDI (in millions) 
 Total FDI Inflow Real Estate Inflow Share 
1990 48422 6608 0.1365 
1991 22799 -256 n/a 
1992 19222 859 0.0447 
1993 50663 196 0.0039 
1994 45095 259 0.0057 
1995 58772 -639 n/a 
1996 84455 2535 0.0300 
1997 103398 3962 0.0383 
1998 174434 1760 0.0101 
1999 283376 1930 0.0068 
2000 314007 1071 0.0034 
2001 159461 -2407 n/a 
2002 62870 2099 0.0334 
2003 29722 -760 n/a 
 
 
 
49. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development FDI Country Profile: UNITED 
STATES, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 (follow drop-down 
menu under “FDI Country Profiles” and select “United States of America”). 
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Table 2: United States FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 FDI in Stocks Real Estate Stocks Share 
1990 393911 34939 0.0885 
1991 419108 33577 0.0801 
1992 423131 32486 0.0768 
1993 467412 32213 0.0689 
1994 480667 31613 0.0658 
1995 535553 30170 0.0563 
1996 598021 35169 0.0588 
1997 681842 38241 0.0561 
1998 778418 39545 0.0508 
1999 955726 39397 0.0412 
2000 1256867 40933 0.0326 
2001 1343987 35270 0.0262 
2002 1340011 35986 0.0268 
2003 1378001 39956 0.02899 
 
In contrast to the state of property rights and law in the United States, 
Africa would presumably provide a counterpoint concerning both the formality 
of the regime and the development of the background institutional framework 
in which property rights could be transferred and enjoyed. Table 3 provides 
data for the four countries where data was available via the UNCTAD 
regarding FDI inflows, whereas Table 4 provides data regarding FDI in stocks. 
A point of reference: all currency denominations provided herein are generic. 
They may be pounds, yen, euro, etc. The exact denomination does not matter, 
since the percentage is the important factor. For interested parties, the source 
data at the UNCTAD does provide information pertaining to the currency in 
which each country’s data is denominated. 
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Table 3: Africa FDI (in millions) 
 Uganda Egypt Morocco Tanzania 
1993 
(FDI 
Inflow / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
43.500 
5.100 
.1172 
—— —— —— 
1994 87.400 
10.300 
.1178 
—— —— —— 
1995 110.000 
13.000 
.1182 
—— —— —— 
1996 115.600 
19.200 
.1178 
—— 2,850 
392 
.1375 
—— 
1997 163.000 
19.200 
.1178 
—— 11,499 
305 
.0265 
—— 
1998 190.000 
22.400 
.1179 
—— 4,418 
442 
.1000 
—— 
1999 230.000 
27.200 
.1183 
—— 16,069 
451 
.0281 
541.500 
3.600 
.066 
2000 267.800 
31.600 
.1180 
—— 4,998 
575 
.1150 
282.00 
.100 
.00035 
2001 227.600 
26.900 
.1182 
—— 32,486 
811 
.0249 
467.200 
1.200 
.0026 
2002 230.700 
27.200 
.1180 
—— 5,876 
1,825 
.3106 
—— 
2003 —— —— 23,257 
1,685 
.0725 
—— 
2004 —— —— 9,485 
2,040 
.2151 
—— 
2005 —— —— 26,708 
2,422 
.0907 
—— 
2006 —— 13,084 
39.000 
.0030 
26,070 
4,117 
.1579 
—— 
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Table 4: Africa FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 Uganda Botswana Malawi Morocco Tanzania 
1997 
(FDI 
Stocks / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— 4,877 
65 
.0133 
—— —— —— 
1998 —— 6,160 
112 
.0182 
—— —— 3,386 
n/a 
n/a 
1999 584.300 
.900 
.0015 
7,348 
144 
.0196 
—— —— 2,419 
3 
.0012 
2000 702.300 
4.300 
.0061 
9,826 
161 
.0164 
358.000 
1.000 
.0028 
—— 3,038 
20 
.0066 
2001 —— 9,696 
115 
.0119 
491.000 
2.000 
.0041 
—— 3,777 
21 
.0056 
2002 —— 4,822 
93 
.0190 
—— 123,327 
10,618 
.0861 
—— 
2003 —— 5,187 
118 
.0227 
—— 149,677 
11,670 
.0779 
—— 
2004 —— 4,204 
93 
.0221 
—— 163,393 
13,745 
.0841 
—— 
2005 —— 4,445 
94 
.02111 
—— 191,939 
15,489 
.0807 
—— 
2006 —— —— —— 253,180 
20,451 
.0808 
—— 
 
Asia provides a picture of developed and modern market economies, like 
Japan, closed and totalitarian systems, like the military junta-led Myanmar, and 
many shades of gray in-between these poles. Tables 5 and 6 provide the 
relevant date pertaining to FDI in real estate and stock in real estate, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Asia/Eurasia FDI (in millions) 
 Brunei Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Japan Myanmar 
1990 
(FDI 
Inflow / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— —— —— 404,645 
3,542 
.0087 
280.600 
n/a 
n/a 
1991 —— —— —— 589,612 
9,369 
.0159 
5.900 
n/a 
n/a 
1992 —— —— —— 530,600 
30,699 
.0578 
103.700 
n/a 
n/a 
1993 —— —— 1,271.400 
n/a 
n/a 
358,596 
10,722 
.0299 
377.600 
n/a 
n/a 
1994 —— —— 659.700 
n/a 
n/a 
432,702 
3,220 
.0074 
1,351.900 
n/a 
n/a 
1995 —— 96.100 
n/a 
n/a 
964.300 
n/a 
n/a 
369,659 
1,554 
.0042 
668.200 
251.500 
.3762 
1996 —— 47.200 
n/a 
n/a 
1,136.900 
n/a 
n/a 
770,686 
26,478 
.0343 
2,814.200 
623.500 
.2215 
1997 —— 83.800 
n/a 
n/a 
1,321.300 
9.600 
.0073 
678,197 
48,153 
.0710 
1,012.900 
122.200 
.1206 
1998 ——- 109.200 
.100 
.00091 
1,151.500 
3.200 
.0028 
1,340,386 
41,597 
.0310 
54.400 
n/a 
n/a 
1999 747.600 
n/a 
n/a 
44.400 
.200 
.0045 
1,471.700 
1.300 
.00088 
2,399,259 
16,810 
.0070 
58.200 
n/a 
n/a 
2000 549.200 
.060 
.00011 
-2.400 
n/a 
n/a 
1,282.500 
3.300 
.0026 
3,125,083 
34,589 
.0110 
217.700 
28.000 
.1286 
2001 526.400 
.070 
.00013 
5.000 
n/a 
n/a 
2,823 
2.300 
.00081 
2,177,904 
73,560 
.0338 
19.000 
n/a 
n/a 
2002 1,035 
n/a 
n/a 
4.800 
1.600 
.3333 
2,560.600 
25.400 
.0099 
2,186,320 
29,093 
.0133 
86.900 
n/a 
n/a 
2003 —— —— —— 2,116,118 
68,868 
.0325 
—— 
GLEN_FORMATTED_FINAL2 1/7/2011  9:37:51 PM 
Berkeley Business Law Journal Vol. 8, 2010 
140 
Table 6: Asia/Eurasia FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 Kazakhstan Myanmar 
1990 (FDI 
Stocks / Real 
Estate / Share) 
—— 730.100 
n/a 
n/a 
1991 —— 736.000 
n/a 
n/a 
1992 —— 839.700 
n/a 
n/a 
1993 1,271.400 
n/a 
n/a 
1,217.300 
n/a 
n/a 
1994 1,193.100 
n/a 
n/a 
2,569.200 
n/a 
n/a 
1995 2,915.400 
n/a 
n/a 
3,237.400 
251.500 
.0777 
1996 4,589.100 
n/a 
n/a 
6,051.600 
875.000 
.1146 
1997 6,696.100 
n/a 
n/a 
7,064.500 
997.200 
.1411 
1998 7,929.400 
n/a 
n/a 
7,188.900 
997.200 
.1387 
1999 —— 7,177.100 
997.200 
.1389 
2000 —— 7,394.800 
1,025.200 
.1386 
2001 12,871.400 
51.900 
.0040 
7,413.800 
1,025.200 
.1383 
2002 15,353.800 
78.300 
.0051 
7,500.700 
1,025.200 
.1367 
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Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean enjoyed special attention in 
De Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. Noting the obstacles that legality could pose 
in property transactions, De Soto found that purchasing a home in Peru 
involves proceeding through five stages, the first of which has 207 discrete 
steps to be taken.50 Such complications contribute to rampant uncertainty 
regarding the true and legal state of title and inhibit transacting in the first 
place. Tables 7 and 8 address the relevant data for a number of countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
 
50. DE SOTO, supra note 34, at 18-20. 
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Table 7: Latin America/Caribbean FDI (in millions) 
 Brazil Chile Mexico Paraguay Peru Venezuela 
1990 
(FDI 
Inflow / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— —— —— 71.100 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 778.200 
64.900 
.0834 
1991 —— —— —— 81 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 231.200 
5.100 
.0200 
1992 —— 998.900 
10.700 
.0107 
—— 117.100 
n/a 
n/a 
166.900 
n/a 
n/a 
1,937.400 
n/a 
n/a 
1993 —— 1,734.100 
11.500 
.006 
—— 69.600 
n/a 
n/a 
137.900 
1.000 
.0072 
417.600 
n/a 
n/a 
1994 —— 2,521.300 
12.900 
.0051 
15,045.200
221.700 
.0147 
122.500 
n/a 
n/a 
2,809.500 
.200 
.000071 
813 
n/a 
n/a 
1995 —— 3,040.600 
18.900 
.0062 
9,646.400 
64.700 
.0067 
147.400 
n/a 
n/a 
609.200 
.300 
.00049 
985 
n/a 
n/a 
1996 9,644 
83 
.0086 
4,821.900 
45.800 
.0095 
9,943.100 
64.200 
.0064 
139.600 
n/a 
n/a 
1,176.800 
.100 
.000085 
2,183 
n/a 
n/a 
1997 17,879 
40 
.0022 
5,229.800 
24.100 
.0046 
14,159.700
58.600 
.0041 
225.800 
n/a 
n/a 
1,043.300 
3.200 
.0031 
5,536 
n/a 
n/a 
1998 26,346 
26 
.00098 
5,972.700 
38.500 
.0064 
12,169.600
56.700 
.0046 
333.400 
.200 
.00059 
795.400 
.400 
.00050 
4,495 
n/a 
n/a 
1999 31,235 
84 
.0027 
9,085.600 
24.300 
.0027 
12,856 
169.800 
.0132 
86.700 
4.400 
.0507 
1,398.900 
2.300 
.0016 
3,290 
n/a 
n/a 
2000 33,331 
21 
.00063 
2,977.300 
7.700 
.0026 
15,484.400
269.600 
.0174 
112.400 
.200 
.0018 
1,432.900 
.200 
.00013 
4,464 
n/a 
n/a 
2001 21,042 
187 
.0089 
4,847.700 
21.200 
.0044 
25,334.400
118.300 
.0047 
75.400 
.200 
.0026 
696.200 
1.600 
.0023 
3,448 
n/a 
n/a 
2002 18,778 
197 
.0140 
3,322.100 
3.400 
.0010 
9,696.400 
52.100 
.0054 
—— 669.300 
-.700 
n/a 
1,368 
n/a 
n/a 
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Table 8: Latin America/Caribbean FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 Brazil Paraguay Peru Venezuela 
1990 
(FDI 
Stocks / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
37,243 
161 
.0043 
—— 1,303.700 
5.800 
.0044 
3,864.700 
161.700 
.0418 
1991 38,580 
163 
.0042 
—— 1,336.600 
5.800 
.0043 
4,095.800 
166.800 
.0407 
1992 39,975 
124 
.0031 
—— 1,503.500 
5.800 
.0038 
6,033.200 
166.800 
.0276 
1993 47,036 
132 
.0028 
—— 1,641.500 
6.800 
.0041 
6,450.800 
166.800 
.0259 
1994 56,549 
147 
.0026 
—— 4,450.900 
7.000 
.0016 
7,263.800 
166.800 
.0229 
1995 41,696 
1,109 
.0266 
642.500 
1.200 
.0018 
5,060.200 
7.200 
.0014 
8,248.800 
166.800 
.0202 
1996 50,195 
1,140 
.0227 
756.900 
1.200 
.0016 
6,237.000 
7.300 
.0012 
10,431.800 
166.800 
.0159 
1997 65,506 
1,181 
.0180 
895 
1.100 
.0012 
7,280.200 
10.500 
.0014 
15,967.800 
166.800 
.0104 
1998 88,778 
1,206 
.0136 
1,104.700 
1.200 
.0011 
8,075.600 
10.900 
.0013 
20,462.800 
166.800 
.0081 
1999 —— 1,116.400 
5.600 
.0050 
9,474.500 
13.200 
.0014 
23,752.800 
166.800 
.0070 
2000 103,015 
798 
.0077 
1,210 
5.400 
.0047 
10,907.400 
13.400 
.0012 
28,216.800 
166.800 
.0059 
2001 —— 1,032.100 
4.600 
.0046 
11,603.600 
15 
.0013 
31.664.800 
166.800 
.0053 
2002 —— —— 12,273 
14.300 
.0011 
33,032.800 
166.800 
.0050 
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Finally, Europe is an area that, like Asia before it, spans almost the entire 
length of existing property systems, from the formalized systems of the longer-
term democracies of Western Europe, to the mixed systems of the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Europe thus may provide a basis of 
comparison not only externally by reference to other geographical regions, but 
internally as well. The concluding tables in this article address the relevant data 
for 17 European countries. A side-note: Russia is included within this group, 
but this inclusion should not be taken as a substantive assertion regarding that 
country’s place in world politics or economics. Russia could as easily have 
been placed in the Asia/Eurasia grouping. 
 
Table 9.1: Europe FDI (in millions) 
 Belgium 
& Luxem-
bourg 
Austria Bulgaria Hungary Germany France Finland 
1990 
(FDI 
Inflow / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— —— —— —— 2,447 
n/a 
n/a 
7,512 
1,097 
.1460 
—— 
1991 —— —— —— —— 4,011 
n/a 
n/a 
9,553 
1,100 
.1151 
—— 
1992 —— —— —— —— -1,668 
88 
n/a 
12,849 
1,464 
.1139 
306 
n/a 
n/a 
1993 —— —— —— —— 311 
-295 
n/a 
10,568 
1,245 
.1178 
832 
n/a 
n/a 
1994 —— —— —— —— 5,920 
-21 
n/a 
9,295 
1,269 
.1365 
1,386 
1 
.00072 
1995 164,321 
1,321 
.0080 
—— —— —— 8,811 
32 
.0036 
10,172 
1,102 
.1083 
781 
n/a 
n/a 
1996 266,223 
3,790 
.0142 
—— —— —— 5,057 
-61 
n/a 
17,128 
1,019 
.0595 
857 
11 
.0128 
1997 177,938 
-53,442 
n/a 
2,354 
151 
.0641 
—— —— 10,856 
-529 
n/a 
20,619 
627 
.0304 
1,846 
21 
.0114 
1998 —— 4,078 
89 
.0218 
537.300 
.100 
.00018 
—— 22,127 
24 
.0011 
27,866 
1,808 
.0649 
10,915 
82 
.0075 
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1999 5,395,946 
-1,694 
n/a 
2,792 
199 
.0713 
818.800 
1.100 
.0013 
473,478 
25,391 
.0536 
52,634 
139 
.0026 
43,688 
3,613 
.0827 
4,327 
n/a 
n/a 
2000 9,674,153 
-1,372 
n/a 
9,595 
369 
.0384 
1,001.500 
6.300 
.0063 
464,117 
35,133 
.0757 
215,209 
-161 
n/a 
46,945 
1,091 
.0232 
9,588 
n/a 
n/a 
2001 3,818,373 
2,098 
.00055 
6,574 
266 
.0404 
—— —— 23,622 
562 
.0238 
56,407 
2,230 
.0395 
4,172 
n/a 
n/a 
2002 —— 379 
223 
.5884 
—— —— 38,269 
-200 
n/a 
51,965 
2,651 
.0510 
8,415 
n/a 
n/a 
2003 —— 6,485 
852 
.1314 
—— —— 11,400 
-16 
n/a 
41,627 
2,844 
.0683 
—— 
 
Table 9.2: Europe FDI (in millions) 
 Denmark Czech 
Rep. 
Lithuania Poland Portugal Russian Fed. 
1991 
(FDI 
Inflow / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
9,333 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— —— —— 
1992 6,127 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— —— —— 
1993 10,819 
n/a 
n/a 
653.500 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— —— 
1994 31,150 
n/a 
n/a 
868.500 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 1,038.500 
48.200 
.0464 
—— 
1995 23,423 
n/a 
n/a 
2,562.200 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 495.400 
53.100 
.1072 
—— 
1996 4,453 
n/a 
n/a 
1,428.400 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 4,498 
50.100 
.0111 
1,145 
15.100 
.0132 
—— 
1997 18,482 
500 
.0270 
1,300.400 
42 
.0323 
1,418 
33.600 
.0237 
4,908.200 
44.900 
.0091 
2,165.700 
87.500 
.0404 
—— 
1998 51,757 
n/a 
n/a 
3,717.900 
340 
.0914 
3,702 
53.400 
.0144 
6,364.900 
27.400 
.0043 
2,824.700 
-50.900 
n/a 
3,361 
6 
.0018 
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1999 116,853 
n/a 
n/a 
6,324 
421 
.06657 
1,945.800 
46.500 
.0239 
7,269.600 
144.300 
.0198 
1,157.800 
111.400 
.0962 
4,260 
n/a 
n/a 
2000 273,354 
n/a 
n/a 
4,986.300 
749 
.1502 
1,515.500 
88.700 
.0585 
9,342.300 
283.800 
.0303 
6,998.300 
110.100 
.0157 
4,429 
2 
.00045 
2001 95,919 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— 6,584.500 
155.800 
.0237 
—— 
2002 52,344 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— 1,959.800 
12.200 
.0062 
—— 
2003 17,092 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— 852.200 
147.400 
.1729 
—— 
2004 -64,236 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— —— —— 
 
Table 10.1: Europe FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 Austria Hungary Germany France Finland Denmark Czech 
Rep. 
Croatia 
1991 
(FDI 
Stocks / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— —— 96,109 
2,379 
.0247 
—— 2,934 
n/a 
n/a 
87,200 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 
1992 —— —— 98,998 
2,891 
.0292 
107,35
3 
12,330 
.1148 
3,254 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— 
1993 —— —— 102,505 
2,526 
.0246 
121,40
3 
13,995 
.1152 
4,102 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— —— 
1994 11,801 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 110,194 
2,859 
.0259 
133,20
8 
14,920 
.1120 
5,356 
6 
.0011 
108,554 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 
1995 14,458 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 121,605 
3,512 
.0289 
143,00
1 
16,011 
.1119 
6,205 
22 
.0035 
—— —— —— 
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1996 15.626 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 129,191 
4,214 
.0326 
159,75
0 
18,747 
.1174 
6,871 
7 
.0010 
132,800 
3,500 
.0264 
—— —— 
1997 17,922 
n/a 
n/a 
2,046.200 
169.200 
.0826 
145,536 
3,844 
.0264 
178,84
2 
19,717 
.1102 
8,688 
n/a 
n/a 
—— 9,233.7
00 
312 
.0338 
—— 
1998 20,117 
235 
.0117 
2,364.400 
238.200 
.1007 
176,875 
4,555 
.0257 
211,02
6 
21,693 
.1028 
14,103 
107 
.0076 
199,078 
n/a 
n/a 
14,375.
100 
794.50
0 
.0553 
—— 
1999 23,364 
283 
.0121 
2,624.500 
353.100 
.1345 
234,177 
4,772 
.0203 
243,54
7 
22,949 
.0942 
18,236 
n/a 
n/a 
311,045 
n/a 
n/a 
17,552.
100 
1,297.6
00 
.0739 
—— 
2000 32,704 
293 
.0089 
2,935.500 
461.500 
.1572 
291,900 
4,703 
.0161 
279,17
9 
26,718 
.0957 
26,086 
n/a 
n/a 
534,976 
n/a 
n/a 
21,643.
700 
1,994.5
00 
.0922 
5,192.50
0 
24.600 
.0047 
2001 38,952 
243 
.0062 
—— 308,812 
5,199 
.0168 
335,08
6 
33,389 
.0996 
27,312 
n/a 
n/a 
567,087 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 
2002 41,488 
446 
.0107 
—— 283,968 
4,926 
.0173 
368,59
0 
40,785 
.1106 
32,428 
n/a 
n/a 
521,472 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 
2003 —— —— 306,042 
5,072 
.0165 
411,91
0 
48,700 
.1182 
—— 515,968 
n/a 
n/a 
—— —— 
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Table 10.2: Europe FDI in Stocks (in millions) 
 Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Russian Fed. Slovakia Slovenia 
1994 
(FDI 
Stocks / 
Real 
Estate / 
Share) 
—— —— —— —— —— —— 1,325.9 
2 
.0015 
1995 —— —— —— 13,338.5 
612.6 
.0459 
—— —— 1,763.4 
4.7 
.0026 
1996 —— 2,801.2 
25.8 
.0092 
—— 15,503.4 
790 
.0509 
—— 1,446.8 
40.7 
.0281 
1,998.1 
7.5 
.0037 
1997 —— 4,162.5 
67.1 
.0161 
11,463.4 
59.8 
.0052 
17,636.9 
829.1 
.047 
—— 1,670.6 
54.1 
.0324 
2,207.3 
13.7 
.0062 
1998 —— 6,501.2 
93 
.0143 
14,587.2 
91.8 
.0063 
20,968.1 
805.4 
.0384 
11,769 
114 
.0097 
2,128.4 
85.8 
.0403 
2,765.8 
41.1 
.0148 
1999 —— 8,252.1 
138.6 
.0168 
22,479.2 
152.5 
.0068 
23,411 
1,090.2 
.0465 
12,757 
92 
.0072 
2,272.2 
106.1 
.0467 
2,656.5 
40 
.015 
2000 1,277.4 
69,800 
.0546 
9,337.3 
252.2 
.027 
26,074.9 
558 
.0214 
30,264.8 
1,199.1 
.0396 
16,125 
98 
.0061 
3,733 
108.4 
.0290 
2,808.5 
24 
.0085 
2001 1,494.8 
186.3 
.1246 
—— 34,227 
1,057.3 
.0308 
39,229.9 
36.8 
.00094 
—— —— —— 
2002 —— —— —— 41,191.2 
39.8 
.00097 
—— —— —— 
 
IV. IS THE MARKET FOR FDI IN REAL ESTATE A LEMONS MARKET? 
The evidence regarding FDI and stock in real estate does not contradict the 
hypothesis that percentages of both should be higher in countries with formal 
property systems and adequate institutional and legal development to support 
and vindicate the existence of property rights. Yet the data provided herein 
does not unequivocally support this hypothesis either. 
In the United States, FDI in real estate ranged from under one percent of 
total FDI, to over thirteen percent, with a value in the range of three percent 
approximating a mean. Stock in real estate ranged from two-and-a-half percent 
to almost nine percent, with a mean of approximately five percent. Such 
investment is, however, robust in the United States in terms of both direct 
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purchases and stock. 
Africa, followed by Asia, provides a more nuanced picture. There is robust 
FDI in real estate in Uganda, where real estate FDI consistently accounted for 
nearly twelve percent of total FDI, Botswana, where the percentage generally 
ranged between one and two percent, and Morocco, where the percentage 
ranged broadly between approximately two percent and over thirty-one percent. 
Nonetheless, such investment was anemic in Egypt, Malawi, and Tanzania for 
the few years of data available for these countries, and data on real estate FDI 
for the over forty other countries on the African continent was not available via 
the UNCTAD. Arguing from negatives is often dangerous, but the lack of such 
data at least indicates the possibility that investment in real estate is 
extraordinarily low to non-existent on most of the African continent. 
The same negative and lack of significant data is at issue in Asia and 
Eurasia, where only four countries provided data indicating any investment in 
real estate. Such direct investment was generally under one percent of the total, 
and most of the time significantly under one percent. The obvious exception to 
this “rule” is Japan, where investment was robust and ranged from 
approximately one percent through over seven percent, with a mean in the 
range of three percent. Myanmar also provided a counterpoint. Although there 
were many years indicating no such investment, in the years investment is 
noted it is generally high. Yet this data also incorporates aid inflows and other 
sources that may not be considered traditional investment, potentially skewing 
any conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence in Myanmar. 
Real estate FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean is comparatively low 
and, for the most part, accounts for less than one percent of total inflows noted 
by the UNCTAD. Additionally, like Africa and Asia before it, the region has 
only six countries with relevant data, lending credence to the negative inference 
that such investment is either nascent or non-existent. 
Regarding Europe, real estate FDI is generally robust in the traditional 
Western liberal democracies, i.e., old Europe. Austria, France and Portugal all 
have significant levels of FDI in real estate, while Germany has a significant 
share of investment in stock. Real estate FDI and stock investment is similarly 
robust in Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, but those countries offer less 
data to go by, while other countries formerly within the orbit of the Soviet 
regime, including Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Russia itself, are short on 
both relevant data and investment. This fact is generally consistent with the 
thesis of this article, as it is these emergent economies that would have to 
develop property rights regimes and institutional frameworks within which 
those rights can be exercised and protected. As noted previously with Russia, 
despite some steps forward, such broad initiatives and reforms have been 
largely not undertaken or insufficiently developed. 
To conclude this brief review, the data collected and analyzed lends 
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cautious support to the hypothesis that investment in real estate will be anemic 
in countries where property rights regimes are insufficiently developed and 
where there is a lack of competent and independent counteracting institutions to 
balance the explicit shortcomings of the systems. Yet the data is not 
unequivocal and there are exceptions on both sides—developed economies 
with little or no such investment, and developing and transition economies that 
evidence strong FDI in real estate and stock. Could the potential explanation 
for these outliers undermine the hypothesis posed herein? Or is the hypothesis 
simply in need of a more accurate empirical measure? 
First, there are undoubtedly problems with the use of FDI as the relevant 
indicator. Although there have been moves towards the greater standardization 
of how, when, and what data is collected, countries generally disregard these 
standards when collecting and categorizing their investment flows. Such 
categorization might obscure evidence regarding commercial investment in real 
estate if that data is simply folded into a broader “business” category of 
investment. Countries may also be lethargic in collecting and reporting data. 
This is apparent from the small sample of countries where data is available, as 
well as the gaps in data provided by those countries. Additionally, countries 
may reclassify or exclude certain types of potentially relevant information, 
including cross-border non-commercial real estate transactions, as 
insufficiently “investment” oriented. There is also the problem of reporting the 
net, rather than gross, inflow. This leads to the problem of negative FDI, as 
evidenced by the case of the United States and Germany. Here, what is reported 
is the net inflow of investment in real estate, balanced against the investment 
made by the domestic country. This skews a comparison of the percentage of 
the inflow that real estate investment represents, as it is not the gross inflow of 
such investment, but the net, that is being measured. This at times minimizes 
the data relevant for this article, as, again in the cases of the United States and 
Germany. It may also lead to errors on the other side, as in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan’s data in 2002, when nearly all sectors but the real estate sector 
were negative, thus falsely inflating the real estate percentage for that year. 
Second, outside any issues of collection or reporting, FDI might itself be a 
weak indicator of relevant investment patterns on account of the very nature of 
foreign investment. Although foreign investment has exploded in recent years, 
it is by no means spread evenly across the countries in the world. So there is a 
threshold issue concerning the coverage of FDI as an indicator. Many countries 
might have no FDI to speak of, let alone FDI in real estate, although this fact 
alone may point to relevant shortcomings in the domestic legal and institutional 
regimes. On the other hand, countries might have robust FDI in certain sectors 
or along certain measures, which square with their domestic economies. 
Finland, for example, is home to many transnational corporations, but real 
estate FDI is not particularly high. To this end, many countries domestic 
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economies or circumstances might simply be geared towards indicators other 
than real estate. The lack of significant levels of FDI in real estate may say 
nothing about the adequacy of the domestic property law system. So, on this 
rationale, FDI in real estate, although fitting as an intuitive matter, might, in the 
end, not be the best empirical measure of this article’s hypothesis. Of course, if 
the problems noted in the preceding paragraphs could be cured or controlled 
for, FDI may, in the end, still give an accurate empirical test. 
Leaving aside the specific issue of testing “law as asymmetric information” 
in the context of real estate transactions, are there better metrics to test the 
general theory that law might constitute asymmetric information and thereby 
lead to market failure? The investment composition of domestic stock 
exchanges might provide an empirical measure. As finance and investment has 
grown, the prevalence of stocks exchanges has risen, even in countries with 
weaker institutional legal and securities frameworks. Measuring the level of 
foreign investment in domestic exchanges might provide a measure of whether 
potential asymmetries in information hinder foreign investment in domestic 
stock. At the same time, however, stock by its nature provides both a certain 
warrant of quality and protections to investors.51 In the case of real estate, many 
countries had higher investment in stock in real estate than in real estate 
generally, as the securitization provides, in some measure, information. 
Accordingly, if stock were to be used, it must be used generally rather than as 
an industry specific measure, i.e., the total composition of foreign investment 
on a domestic exchange would be the appropriate measure, rather than 
investment in certain limited sectors where asymmetric information may or 
may not be present in the underlying legal regimes. 
There are sure to be additional and perhaps more accurate ways to measure 
the effects of asymmetric information concerning legal attributes on 
transnational financing and investment. This article represents only an 
introductory step down this path, but also reinforces the importance of 
functioning and independent domestic legal and judicial systems to 
development.52 If weak or biased institutions are present, they are unlikely to 
give the kind of institutional structure to a domestic economy that foreign 
investment needs. The development of such institutions, on the other hand, 
should lead to cyclical developmental processes, where initial development 
increases investment, which in turn sparks greater domestic reform. This 
reform can then attract more varied and higher levels of investment. Without 
some measure of legal certainty, however, investment is unlikely to reach 
 
51. See generally Hill, supra note 32. 
52. See Symposium, The History of CEELI, the ABA’s Rule of Law Initiative, and the Rule of Law 
Movement Going Forward, 18 MINN.. J. INT’L L. 304 (2009); Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, 
Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341 
(2009). 
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significant levels. It is this level of legal uncertainty that needs to be quantified 
and measured in the years to come, as investment and trade become even more 
global than they are at present. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance and value of information in economic transactions is only 
likely to increase in the years to come. Trade, investment, and business can no 
longer be understood as matters of purely local or national concern between 
similarly situated buyers and sellers, but rather as transnational affairs, often 
comprised of multiple parties of multiple nationalities proceeding under 
potentially multiple conceptions of how the law should operate. This 
conceptual distance between buyers and sellers has the potential to create value 
uncertainty; as part of that value uncertainty, asymmetric information regarding 
the governing law may arise. This article represents an attempt to quantify this 
potential for asymmetric information regarding legal attributes in the narrow 
context of real estate FDI. While more study is certainly warranted, it may be 
inevitable that a certain level of asymmetry in information regarding legal 
attributes will infect most transnational economic transactions. What need not 
be inevitable, however, is a failure of transactions on this account. Rather, 
states must undertake the necessary reforms to institute effective counteracting 
institutions, while also minimizing the potential for asymmetric information 
regarding legal attributes. 
In the context of real estate investment, these reforms would include a 
formal title registry, clarifications regarding what interests can be conveyed and 
the form such conveyances should take, and a simplification of the process. 
More generally, an independent and impartial judiciary is a necessary 
counteracting institution no matter what the specific legal context; clear and 
lucid statutes and regulations are similarly necessary. Adequate publication and 
dissemination of legal principles should also be undertaken by the relevant 
authorities. These reforms, as more fully addressed in the foregoing, would 
have the effect of shrinking the knowledge gap between sellers and buyers, 
while also providing effective dispute settlement mechanisms that would limit 
the impact of asymmetric information. Through these reforms, developing 
countries and transition economies can initiate a productive cycle of reform, 
followed by investment, which may fuel further reforms. Accordingly, by 
minimizing the impact of asymmetric information, or eliminating such 
information itself, countries that have long been avoided by investors could 
become attractive destinations for foreign direct investment. 
